August 14, 2015—San Diego, CA, St. Paul, MN—California Coalition today announces filing of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the United States Supreme Court on behalf of mother Sandra Grazzini Rucki and her five children, in collaboration with counsel, Michelle MacDonald, co-founder of Family Innocence.
In the Petition, Grazzini-Rucki argues that Dakota County, Minnesota Judge David Knutson is not immune for several courses of behavior he undertook in Grazzin-Rucki’s child custody case. Specifically, the Petitioners argue that Judge Knutson’s following behavior is not judicial, and therefore not immune:
(a) Case assignment behavior is administrative, not judicial, and therefore not immune;
(b) Judge Knutson’s personal participation in the children’s psychotherapy is not judicial—but psychotherapeutic behavior, and therefore not immune;
(c) Issuance of a stream of over 3,400 illegal commands to control and oppress the family, including kicking them out of their own home, separating both parents from the children, prohibiting the family from attending church and family events, requiring the Grazzini-Rucki children to undergo psychotherapy, issuing various “stay away” and property control orders, and ordering the family to undergo fraudulent, invasive, and humiliating custody evaluations–all of which are unique 20th Century “Family Court” functions which have no analog at 1871 common law when the Civil Rights Act was passed by Congress, and thus cannot be immune today;
(d) Causing the outrageous warrantless arrest, detention, and shackling of Grazzini-Rucki’s counsel, Ms. MacDonald, to a wheelchair and forcing her to try Grazzini-Rucki’s case in such restraint, and without eyeglasses, shoes, her client files, pen or paper, and after Ms. Grazzini-Rucki had been instructed by deputies to leave the courthouse and not return, is not judicial behavior; and finally
(e) The entire doctrine of judicial immunity is an unconstitutional legislative act by the Supreme Court in the 1967 case of Pierson v. Ray, and therefore a violation of separation of powers, prohibiting United States Courts from exercising legislative authority.
From the Petition:
This case presents issues of judicial immunity for Dakota County, Minnesota Judge David Knutson under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 USC § 1983, including one extraordinary issue of first impression regarding this Court’s Article III jurisdiction to construe Section 1983, and two additional issues reflecting division among the circuits regarding the appropriate test to apply when deciding questions of judicial immunity:
(1) Whether a district court may extend immunity to a judge accused of violating the Civil Rights Act, without conducting a historical analysis of immunity for the functions at 1871 common law as instructed under Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S.Ct. 1497 (2012).
(2) Whether a family court judge is immune under Stump v. Sparkman for the functions of (a) administratively overriding the case assignment process to assign all cases relating to a party, including family, criminal, and third party cases to himself; (b) conducting a psychological “listening session” upon a litigant’s children, absent any motion or relevance to any issue before the judge; (c) issuing a stream of “stay away” and property control commands and compelling a family to undergo counseling; and (d) conducting a trial with the attorney handcuffed in a wheelchair, and forced to proceed with the client’s case, without files, notes, evidence, eyeglasses, pen, paper or the litigant? Whether these behaviors, performed by a family court judge, are “judicial acts” within the jurisdiction of a family court under Stump v. Sparkman.
(3) Whether this Court possessed jurisdiction under Article III, of the United States Constitution in Pierson v. Ray to construe Section 1983 contrary to its unambiguous language and vividly-recorded congressional intent, thereby exercising legislative power vested exclusively in Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution, and in excess of its judicial power.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) this Court construed Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 contrary to its unambiguous language and vividly-recorded congressional intent, wrongly analogizing the legislative “speech and debate” liberty from Tenney v. Brandhove 341 U. S. 367 (1951) to the sovereign judicial function. Contradicting the unambiguous statute and clear congressional record, the Court “presumed” that congress did not intend Section 1983 to abrogate immunity of state judges to common law torts which existed under nineteenth century English common law, as recited in Bradley v. Fisher 80 U.S.335 (1872). Following this presumption, this Court has instructed: “Our initial inquiry is whether an official claiming immunity under § 1983 can point to a common-law counterpart to the privilege he asserts.” Malley v. Briggs 475 U. S. 335, 339-340 (1986).
The Eighth Circuit failed to conduct this “initial inquiry,” instead construing the doctrine of judicial immunity contrary Stump v. Sparkman 475 U. S. 335, 339-340 (1986). The court extended immunity to Judge Knutson’s administrative case assignment function under authority from the Tenth Circuit, Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985), which was “mooted” in Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir. 1986), that is directly contrary to Ex parte Virginia 100 U. S. 339, 228 (1879); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United State 446 U. S. 719, 734-737 (1980); and Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc. 508 U. S. 429 (1993).
It also extended immunity to Judge Knutson’s psycho-therapeutic function under a test from the Fifth Circuit, McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir.1972), a case that was abrogated in Stump. The court refused to analyze Judge Knutson’s property control and therapy commands and the shackling of counsel.
Yet even if properly construed, absolute immunity is an unconstitutional abomination—regularly depriving millions of United States citizens the fundamental right of remedy for constitutional injury by judicial wrongdoing. The incontrovertible record demonstrates that the 1871 Congress enacted Section 1983 specifically to abrogate this insult to justice. This Court’s decision resurrecting it in Pierson v. Ray was an impermissible—indeed reckless—exercise of exclusive congressional authority.
As is customary for a petition for writ of certiorari, the petitioner must show why the Supreme Court should take the extremely unusual step of granting the Petition. Here, MacDonald and California Coalition conducted extensive research on the current status of the case law existing in the circuit courts of appeal regarding judicial immunity, and presented arguments to the Supreme Court that the courts of appeal are disregarding clear instructions by the Supreme Court on several issues.
1. Courts of appeal are failing to conduct a preliminary test to determine if, in 1871, judges were immune for the accused functions
From the Petition:
The Lower Courts have Failed to Require The Official Claiming Absolute Immunity to Prove a Common Law Analog to accused function
Section 1983 unambiguously regulates “every person” acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The vivid record of congressional debates preceding the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 demonstrates Congress intended “person” to include judges. See, e.g.,Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 185-191 (1961); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 559 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 US 158, 163 (1992). Circumventing traditional statutory interpretation, this Court in Pierson “presumed” that despite the statute’s facial clarity and vivid recorded debate, Congress intended to incorporate a “judicial immunity,” which Chief Justice Warren believed was well-settled at 1871 common law. Pierson at 554-555.
Following this “presumption,” this Court has instructed lower courts to evaluate an official’s claim to an immunity by examining English and American common law to determine whether—as of 1871—an official performing the accused function enjoyed immunity. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 339-340 (1986) (“Our initial inquiry is whether an official claiming immunity under § 1983 can point to a common-law counterpart to the privilege he asserts.”); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976); Burns v. Reed, 500 U. S. 478 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[w]here we have found that a tradition of absolute immunity did not exist as of 1871, we have refused to grant such immunity under § 1983.”). The Court “has for that reason been quite sparing in recognizing absolute immunity for state actors.” Burns at 486-87.
A. The Lower Courts Failed To Make Findings That The Accused Functions Existed, And Were Immune, As Of 1871
This Court has instructed that lower courts analyzing an official’s immunity defense must examine nineteenth century social and legal systems to determine whether the accused function was then immune. See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk,, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1503-07 (2012) (examining nineteenth century caselaw); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U. S. 118, 124, n. 11, 132 (1997) (Scalia, J., Thomas, J., concurring) (examining 17th and 18th century caselaw); Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U. S. 429, 432 (1993) (examining treatises and scholarly publications describing history of court reporting).
As noted by Justices Thomas and Scalia, dissenting from denial of certiorari in Hoffman v. Harris, 511 U. S. 1060 (1994), this historical inquiry is fundamental, yet ignored among the circuits:
The courts that have accorded absolute immunity . . . appear to have overlooked the necessary historical inquiry; none has seriously considered whether social workers enjoyed absolute immunity for their official duties in 1871. If they did not, absolute immunity is unavailable to social workers under § 1983. This all assumes, of course, that “social workers” (at least as we now understand the term) even existed in 1871. If that assumption is false, the argument for granting absolute immunity becomes (at least) more difficult to maintain.
Id. (slip op. at 5); see also Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U. S. 429 (1993) (denying court reporter absolute immunity because reporting began after 1871). Extending an immunity absent this foundation is error. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 249-50 (1974) (“These cases, in their present posture, present no occasion for a definitive exploration of the scope of immunity . . . .”). The judge bears the burden of proof. Burns v. Reed, 500 U. S. 478, 486–487 (1991).
Judge Knutson failed to proffer, and the district court and court of appeals failed to conduct this threshold inquiry for any of the four accused functions. Absent this required threshold showing, Judge Knutson is not entitled to immunity.
The widespread failure among the circuits to conduct the threshold inquiry of the historical foundations for a governmental immunity as of 1871 warrants supervisory review under Supreme Court Rule 10(a) and both conflict and error review under Rule 10(c).
2. The lower courts have mis-applied the seminal case of Stump v. Sparkman, which established the relevant test for determining judicial immunity
From the Petition:
The Court of Appeals Mis-CONSTRUED STUMP v. SPARKMAN, When It Extended Absolute Immunity to Functions that Cannot Be Immune
B. Case-Assignment is Not Judicial
In extending immunity to Judge Knutson’s improper assignments, override of Deputy Administrator Susan J. Reichenbach case assignment function, and usurping case files involving Grazzini-Rucki, or her former husband, the court of appeals cited, but failed to apply Stump, instead diverting to a test from the Tenth Circuit case of Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985), “mooted” in Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir. 1986). Martinez is inconsistent with Stump.
[T]he factors determining whether an act by a judge is a “judicial” one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.
Stump at 362.
Judges don’t “normally” assign cases, participate in children’s therapy sessions, or carry on custody trials without the parent, and while the parent’s attorney is in handcuffs. The court of appeals cited Stump, but failed to examine whether case assignment is (i) “normally performed by a judge” and (ii) within the “expectations of the parties.” It instead asserted rationale used in Martinez–that Judge Knutson’s case assignment was judicial because it “directly concerns the case-deciding process.” Martinez at 434; App. 3a. The failure to analyze under Stump is error reviewable under Supreme Court Rule 10(c).
1. Martinez was Mooted and is Inconsistent with Generations of This Court’s Precedent
In extending immunity under Martinez, the court of appeals erred under this Court’s precedents holding that judicial officers performing executive functions are not immune. See, e.g, Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 228 (1879) (“[a]dministrative decisions, even though they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not…been regarded as judicial acts.”); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, 446 U. S. 719, 734-737 (1980) (refusing to extend immunity to behavior promulgating a code of conduct for attorneys because it was “not an act of adjudication but one of rulemaking.”); Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U. S. 429, 435 (1993) (finding court reporters “part of judicial function” yet not absolutely immune); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U. S. 118 (1997) (reasoning prosecutor’s investigation “concerns” adjudication but not “judicial”).
In Martinez the Tenth Circuit held Chief Judge Winner’s self-assignment of a case was judicial (a) “in the sense that it directly concerns the case-deciding process” and (b) “by statute it is the responsibility of the chief judge.” Martinez at 434 (citing Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 304-05 (5th Cir.1980)). Martinez reasoned “an act may be administrative or ministerial for some purposes and still be a “judicial” act for purposes of immunity from liability for damages.” Martinez at 434. Though both Martinez and Rheuark cite Stump, they construe that test incorrectly.
(a) This Court has never held that a given function may be both judicial and administrative. Indeed, the Court has for generations held the opposite—that judicial officers performing non-judicial functions are not entitled to absolute immunity even if the function “concerns the case-deciding process.” See, e.g., Antoine, Ex Parte Virgina, supra.
Apologists for absolute immunity claim the injustices it imposes are checked by adversarial process, restraint by principles of law, and vulnerability to appellate review. See, e.g., Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U. S. 193, 207-08 (1985) (refusing to grant prison-discipline committee absolute immunity because lack of procedural safeguards); Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 516 (1978) (granting administrative law judges absolute immunity because procedural safeguards were comparable to judicial process). But Judge Knutson’s override of the Deputy Administrator to assign himself to all past and future cases is not reviewable, not a resolution of a dispute, and not subject to principles of law—but a ministerial rule.
Other circuits recognize that a judge performing executive functions cannot be immune under either Stump or Imbler. See, e.g., Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F. 2d 1229, 1235-36 (7th Cir. 1980) (declining immunity to judge performing prosecutorial function); Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 857 (5th Cir. 1981) (declining immunity to judge acting as “as complaining witness, prosecutor, factfinder, and judge.”). The fact that a judge is authorized to also function as an administrator does not convert the “administrator” function into a judicial one. See Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir. 1970) (cited favorably in Stump at 370 n. 10) (“A judge does not cease to be a judge when he undertakes to chair a PTA meeting, but, of course, he does not bring judicial immunity to that forum, either.”).
(b) Further, the existence of statutory “responsibility” is not dispositive of the “judicial in nature” issue. Statutes may grant judges a variety of non-judicial decision-making authority. A simple example is that Chief Justice Roberts is “authorized” under 20 U.S.C. § 76cc to serve as the Chancellor of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution. Such authorization does not convert Chief Justice Roberts’ governance into a judicial act.
Moreover, even under Martinez Judge Knutson could not be immune because, unlike Judge Winner, he is not a “Chief Judge” and has no oversight authority over Deputy Administrators. Martinez at 434.
(c) Finally, the court of appeals failed to observe the distinction between Judge Knutson’s status as a judge and the functions accused. Courts must examine the “nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Buckley at 269. The mere fact that an officer claiming immunity is a judge is insufficient to accomplish absolute immunity. Rather, absolute immunity depends on whether the accused function was absolutely immune as of 1871. Stump at 362; Malley at 339-40.
The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits’ construction and analysis under Stump to extend immunity to administrative case assignment under Martinez and Rheuark is error subject to review in this Court under Supreme Court Rules 10(a) and (c).
2. Properly Construing Stump, the Court of Appeals Would Have Found No Immunity
Would the court of appeals have applied Stump, it would have found Judge Knutson was not immune: Usurping court files by overriding Deputy Administrator Reichenbach’s case assignment process is not (a) “normally” performed by a judge and (b) “within the expectations of the parties.”
(a) Judge Knutson took the unusual step of commanding Judicial District Deputy Administrator Reichenbach to assign him to the divorce and order for protection cases related to the family, and then made orders assigning himself to “all court proceedings of any type involving Sandra Grazzini-Rucki and David Rucki.” App. 54a. These included David Rucki’s criminal cases, and cases involving third parties. App. 8a, 48a-63a. A judge usurping all pending and any future cases to himself is not “normally performed by a judge”— case assignment is always random and performed by Judicial District Administrators. App. 46a
(b) Nor can any officer’s case assignment be “within the expectations of the parties” because assignment occurs before a judge is assigned a case, and long before the parties have any “expectation” about a judge acting. Certainly Judge Knutson presented no evidence that Petitioner had any such expectation of such. In fact, Petitioner’s expectations were the opposite—under Minnesota rules, any party can remove a Judge by notice “within 10 days” after the party receives notice of which Judge is to preside over the case. Judge Knutson’s administrative override eviscerated Petitioner’s right to removal.
3. The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits Improperly Apply Imbler’s “Intimately Associated” Test
Citing Martinez, the court of appeals extended immunity because Judge Knutson’s override “directly concerns the case-deciding process.” This test resembles Imbler’s “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler at 430. However, Imbler’s test does not apply to judges (see, e.g., Lopez, supra) and there is no prosecutorial function or “criminal process” in family court. Obviously cases are assigned by a court administrator before the “judicial phase” begins. Minnesota family court judges, guardians, and psychologists exercise nearly unfettered discretion under weak procedural restriction despite that family courts adjudicate fundamental rights including speech, association, conscience, movement, and property ownership and control. See, e.g., People United for Children, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 F. Supp. 2d 275, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding family court is not a “court of competent jurisdiction” for Rooker-Feldman analysis because of weak procedural and constitutional protections); Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57, 65 (2000) (describing parental rights as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”).
The Eighth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits’ incorrect application of Imbler to extend immunity to judges performing administrative case assignment warrants exercise of the Court’s supervisory and conflict resolution jurisdiction under Rules 10(a) and (c).
3. Judge Knutson’s “listening session” was not judicial, but psychological, and therefore not immune
From the Petition:
C. Psychotherapeutic Function Is Not Judicial
The court of appeals extended absolute immunity to Judge Knutson for participating in what he himself described as a “listening session” with the Grazzini-Rucki children “for the sole purpose of facilitating therapy. . . This session was not pursuant to any motion or issue under consideration at the time.” App. 3a-4a. Though he threatened and coerced the children, his behavior—by his own admission—was irrelevant to any issue and was not adjudication, but psychotherapy.
Neither lower court made findings required under Stump regarding (a) whether psychotherapy was “a function normally performed by a judge” (at 1871 common law) and (b) “the expectation of the parties.” The court of appeals further erred in finding that psychotherapy is “judicial” because the session was (a) “held at the courthouse”; (b) “. . . attended by the parties, the attorneys, the guardian ad litem, and the therapist”; and (c) “. . . was recorded by a court reporter.” App. 3a-4a. These facts are not relevant under Stump.
1. The Court of Appeals Cited Stump, but Applied the Abrogated Fifth Circuit Test from McAlester v. Brown
The court of appeals focused on the location of the session, attendance by parties, and recordation. App. 3a-4a. These are not relevant under Stump, but may be relevant under a test originating in the Fifth Circuit—McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir.1972)—a test that was abrogated in Stump at p. 361, yet today somehow thrives within the circuits, requiring the Court’s supervisory and conflict resolution jurisdiction under Rules 10(a) and (c).
Stump settled cacophony among the circuits extending immunity inconsistently. Stump at 360-363 and n.10. Justice White “cast aside considerable debris” among the circuits, including McAlester, the leading immunity case from the Fifth Circuit. See Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 857 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U. S. 816 (1981). McAlester’s test found an act “judicial in nature” based on four factors: “(1) the precise act complained of . . . is a normal judicial function; (2) the events involved occurred in the judge’s chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case then-pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose directly and immediately out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity.” McAlester at 1282 (analyzed in Stump at 361).
In Stump, Justice White recited, then rejectedMcAlester’s focus on location of the act being in “chambers” relating to a “pending case,” and during a “visit” to a judge. Stump at 361-2. In rejecting McAlester’s test Justice White favorably cited a Ninth Circuit decision, Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974) which rejected immunity for a judge who physically evicted a litigant from chambers during a “visit” to a judge and relating to a pending case. Stump at 370, n. 10. He also analyzed Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970) which similarly held that a county judge “forcibly removing” a man from a “fiscal court” was not immune. Id. at 820. Clearly Justice White cited Gregory and Lynch to reject McAlester and to emphasize that even if a judge acts “in chambers,” or relating to a “confrontation” or “pending” case, the judge’s behavior may not be “judicial in nature.” See alsoHarper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 857 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U. S. 816 (1981) (deciding child support enforcement proceeding inside of courtroom, by a judge, and recorded by reporter not immune); Mireless v. Waco, 502 U. S. 9, 13 (1991) (deciding physical assault by a judge outside of courtroom immune).
Stump itself undermines the court of appeals’ reliance on “attended by the parties.” Plaintiff Linda Sparkman was absent from and deceived of her mother’s petition to sterilize her: “Linda [Sparkman] entered the DeKalb Memorial Hospital, having been told that she was to have her appendix removed. The following day a tubal ligation was performed upon her. She was released several days later, unaware of the true nature of her surgery.”).
Yet, despite rejection in Stump, the court of appeals applied McAlester’s test—exclusively focusing on location, attended by parties, and relationship to a pending case. The lower court’s application of the wrong test warrants review under Rule 10(c).
2. The Circuits Have Consistently Mis-Construed Stump
McAlester’s persistence despite abrogation in Stump follows an aberration occurring in the Fifth Circuit case of Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1985). Seven years after Stump, the Fifth Circuit in Adams refused to recognize Stump’s abrogation of McAlester’s four factors. As if the Supreme Court were a sister circuit, the Fifth Circuit cited Stump, then turned its back on it. Id. at 297 (“The four factors generally relied upon by this circuit . . . .”) (emphasis added). Adams proceeded to analyze under McAlester’s test rather than Stump, erroneously relying on the four-factor test “debris” “cast aside” by Justice White. Adams at 297.
Adams misperceived McAlester’s vitality because of a peculiar outcome in the case of Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 857 (5th Cir. 1981). In Harper, the Fifth Circuit determined that Judge Merckle was not immune for falsely arresting Harper, a man who had attempted to make a spousal support payment directly to the judge in the judge’s chambers. The judge attempted to place Harper under oath to learn his address, whereupon Harper fled. Judge Merckle ordered bailiffs to chase. They shortly captured and returned Harper to Judge Merckle’s chambers whereupon Judge Merckle placed Harper under oath and questioned him “as complaining witness, prosecutor, factfinder, and judge” in a “contempt proceeding of sorts.” Harper at 852. The hearing was recorded, related to a pending child support case, in the courtroom. Id. Judge Merckle found Harper in contempt, and three days later released. The contempt conviction was reversed on appeal, and Harper sued Judge Merckle. Id. at 854.
In analyzing immunity the Fifth Circuit cited bothMcAlester and Stump as “the guiding lights in our analysis.” Id. at 859. Yet the court ignored Stump and analyzed “judicial act” only under McAlester’s four-factor test, finding Judge Merckle’s behavior did not satisfy all four factors. Harper at 858-59. Judge Merckle appealed to this Court, which denied certiorari. Merckle v. Harper, 454 U. S. 816 (1981).
Four years later Adams cited the denial of certiorari in Harper as indicia of vitality of McAlester’s “four factor” test. The deduction is error. Though Harper cites McAlester and Sparkman as two “guiding lights,” Harper reached result consistent with both McAlester’s (abrogated) four-factor test as well as Stump’s (controlling) “two-factor” authority. Harper’s result was thus correct, but by means of faulty analysis that resurrected McAlester’s test to equal to Stump’s, making this Court’s denial of certiorari on result proper. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 88 (1943).
The Fifth Circuit’s resurrection of McAlester has been perpetuated among many circuits, including the First, Second, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and of course the court of appeals below.
The widespread perpetuation of the Fifth Circuit’s refusal to align with Stump warrants exercise of this Court’s supervisory and conflict jurisdiction under Rules 10(a) and (c).
3. Psychotherapy Is Not Judicial Function Today or in 1871
If the court of appeals would have applied Stump’s “judicial in nature” test, it would have been apparent that in a “listening session” is neither a “function normally performed by a judge” nor within “the expectations of the parties.” Judge Knutson affirmatively stated his purpose was “solely” to facilitate psychotherapy. App. 3a. Psychotherapy is not “normally performed by a judge”—in Minnesota it may be legally performed only by licensed psychologists. Independent investigation is forbidden to judges. Model Code of Judicial Conduct Cannon 3(B)(7) cmt. (1990).
There is no evidence the parties “expected” that Judge Knutson was functioning in any way other than he claimed—facilitatingongoingpsychotherapy. Most importantly, the parties certainly did not “expect” Judge Knutson to threaten the children that they would follow his commands or be punished, causing them fear, and to run away days later.
The district court and the court of appeals diverted from necessary historical investigation to determine whether psychologists “even existed” in 1871, instead drawing analogy between the “listening session” and a “best interests of the child” determination. App. 4a, 39a. They wrongly concluded that a “best interests” determination is “a function normally performed by a judge in deciding custody disputes. . .” and therefore, by analogy, so was the “listening session.” Id.
Yet this Court has disapproved of such “immunity by analogy.” As noted by Justices Thomas and Scalia in Hoffman, this “immunity by analogy” tactic does not satisfy the requirement to examine 1871 common law. See Hoffman at slip op. 5-6 (reciting Imbler v. Pachtman 424 U. S. 409(1976) as holding prosecutors are entitled to immunity for functions “’intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process”) (emphasis by Justice Thomas). Justices Thomas and Scalia criticized these courts for ignoring “the important threshold question whether social workers are, under any circumstances, entitled to absolute immunity.”
Like the court of appeals, many other circuits continue to extend “immunity by analogy” to modern functions without examining historical factual foundation, including at least the First, Fifth, Eighth Ninth and Tenth. Unsurprisingly, the circuits have extended immunity by analogy inconsistently. Id. .
The court of appeals failed to identify a “best interests” functions of a family court existing at 1871 common law because in 1871 no civil judicial tribunal possessed jurisdiction over divorce or child custody. “It is elementary that in the early history of jurisprudence in England the common law courts exercised no jurisdiction over divorce cases, jurisdiction in such matters resting entirely with the ecclesiastical courts of the realm.” Peterson v. Peterson, 24 Haw. 239, 246 (1918). American family law has no common law lineage—it is entirely a twentieth century statutory creation. N. Blake, The Road To Reno, A History of Divorce in the United States 56 (1962). The concept of “best interests of the child” arose in the twentieth century. See R. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 Law and Contemp. Prob. 226, 234 (1975).
4. Under Bradley, Family Court Functions are Inferior, and Thus Not Entitled to Absolute Immunity
“Family” jurisdiction is incontrovertibly specific—and thus inferior to a court of general jurisdiction. Minn. Stat. 518. Family court “in a dissolution proceeding is a court of limited jurisdiction.” King v. State Educ. Dep’t, 182 F.3d 162 (2d Cir.1999); People United for Children, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 F. Supp. 2d 275, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding family court not a “court of competent jurisdiction” for Rooker-Feldman analysis). Randall v. Brigham, 74 U. S. 523 (1868) describes the limited scope of immunity for “inferior courts”: Judges exercising limited jurisdiction were immune for acts within the limited jurisdiction, yet were liable for civil damages for acts in excess of their jurisdiction, and for acts done “maliciously or corruptly.” Randall at 531. This observation was not disturbed in Bradly. While Judge Knutson bears the burden of demonstrating family court function even existed at 1871 common law, in no case will he identify an immunity scope greater than an 1871 inferior court—judicial acts within “family” jurisdiction not done “maliciously or corruptly.” Id.
The court of appeals’ extension of the rule for a court of general jurisdiction—which immunizes acts done with “malice or corruption of motive”—to inferior family jurisdiction was error.
5. The Court of Appeals Conflated (1) “Judicial in Nature” and (2) Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The court of appeals referenced “the flexibility that Minnesota’s custody laws to give to the court to determine the best interests of the children”—concluding that statutory authorization supports a conclusion that the “listening session constituted a function normally performed by a judge in deciding custody disputes.” App. 4a. This is a misconstruction of Stump’s test: The existence of subject matter jurisdiction (“flexible” statutes “to determine the best interests of the children.”) is not determinative of “judicial in nature.” An official asserting immunity must prove both (1) judicial act and (2) within subject matter jurisdiction. Stump at 362.
Yet the court of appeals attributed the second “subject matter jurisdiction” element to the first—“judicial act” factor. When “flexible jurisdiction” is properly analyzed only under the second—subject matter jurisdiction—prong, the court of appeals analysis under the first prong is bereft of supporting findings. The court of appeals’ extension of immunity absent proof of both elements was error. Id.
6. The Circuits are Divided on Immunity of Psychologist and Social Worker Function
The courts of appeal disagree on the level of immunity appropriate for court-connected psychologists and social workers, warranting review under Rules 10(c). The Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have incorrectly extended quasi-judicial immunity to various functions of court-appointed social workers and psychologists, reasoning these investigators are “arms” of a court similar to prosecutors. The Ninth Circuit has corrected its course, aligning with Antoine and Kalina. These stubbornly inconsistent decisions warrant review under Rules 10 (a) and (c).
4. Family Courts’ highly-invasive equitable powers to issue “stay away” and property control orders are unique to family court, which was created in the twentieth century and thus cannot be immune
From the Petition:
D. The Court of Appeals Failed to Analyze (c) “Stay Away” and Property Commands and (d) Arrest and Shackling of Counsel in a Wheelchair at Trial
Neither the district court nor the court of appeals analyzed whether (c) movement and property control orders or (d) arrest and shackling of counsel were immune.
Regarding (c), movement and property control orders, as noted above, modern family courts exercise highly invasive equitable powers to order litigants to stay away from their family and friends, abandon their home, surrender property, and undergo expensive and humiliating “forensic examinations,” psychotherapy, and “supervised visitation.” “[O]ver three thousand four hundred (3,400) directives of Defendant David L Knutson [sic] regulate this [Plaintiff’s] family, without due process or rule of law or rule of evidence” seizing Plaintiff from her home, children and Property. App.22a. Given that these sweeping powers to control family are enabled by twentieth-century legislation—and only in twentieth century family courts—Judge Knutson could not carry his burden of proving such function as “judicial” in 1871.
5. The warrantless arrest and shackling of counsel while forced to try her client’s case is not immune under several Supreme Court precedents
From the Petition:
Regarding (d) — arrest and shackling of counsel — several courts have held physical assault or evicting litigants are not judicial acts. See, e.g., Greggory, Harper, supra. It is apparent that Judge Knutson could not have carried his burden of showing immunity for the illegal arrest and shackling of Petitioner’s counsel, and then carrying on the trial with the attorney in handcuffs.
6. The Civil Rights Act was enacted expressly to abrogate judicial immunity
The 1871 Congress viewed absolute immunity as an abomination, and yet the Supreme Court in Pierson v. Ray illegally resurrected the doctrine—a monarchical rule that was jettisoned in post-revolutionary America. By construing the Civil Rights Act contrary to its face, the Supreme Court in Pierson overstepped its jurisdiction in Article III of the United States Constitution. From the Petition:
Pierson and Stump stand in error for exceeding the judicial power vested in United States courts under Article III of the Constitution
In deciding Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967), this Court construed Section 1983 to narrow its sweep—finding an immunity which is inconsistent with the face of the statute restraining “every person.” Imbler at 417 (“The statute thus creates a species of tort liability that on its face admits of no immunities.”); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 US 158, 163 (1992). Clearer language has likely never emerged from Congress. Id.
A. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Construe An Unambiguous Statute
Article III vests only “judicial power” in this Court. Article I reserves “legislative power” to Congress. “For I agree there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.” A. Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78 (1788). “If congress has given the power to this court, we possess it, not otherwise . . . .” Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U. S. 8, 10 n.1(a) (1799). These principles of course apply to Section 1983. “[I]t is for Congress, not this Court, to determine to what extent to abrogate the judiciary’s common-law immunity.” Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U. S. 522, 543 (1984).
Section 1983 is not a subject for statutory interpretation. “When we find the terms … unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete . . . .” Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U. S. 120, 123 (1989); CTS Corp. v. Walderburger, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., p. 10) (“Congressional intent is discerned primarily from the statutory text.”). The Court “does not revise legislation . . . just because the text as written creates an apparent anomaly.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., p. 10).
Pierson’s “presumption” of Congressional intent to read an immunity into Section 1983 was a legislative act narrowing an unambiguous statute—an act in excess of this Court’s jurisdiction under Article III, and invading exclusive congressional authority under Article I, of the Constitution. On this basis alone, Pierson must be reversed.
B. Any Construction of The Civil Rights Act Must Admit Congress’s Remedial Intent
Congress adopted the language of Section 1983 from its criminal predecessor—the 1866 Civil Rights Act, today codified at 18 U.S.C. § 242. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). Section 1983 was introduced by Ohio Representative Shellabarger, who explained his bill on the House floor by referencing Section 2 of the 1866 Act: “that section provides a criminal proceeding in identically the same case as this one provides a civil remedy for . . . ” Section 1 of the 1871 Act (now Section 1983) passed rapidly through Congress because Congress recognized Section 1 as merely “adding” a civil remedy to the 1866 Act, for which there is no absolute immunity. United States v. Lanier, 520 U. S. 259, 266 (1997) (per curiam). The Acts thus “must be construed as in pari materia”—any construction of the 1871 Act must admit congressional intent in enacting the 1866 Act. Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1945).
On that record it is incontrovertible that the 42nd Congress affirmatively rejected common law judicial immunity.
” [T]he decisions of the county judges, who are made little kings, with almost despotic powers to carry out the demands of the legislature which elected them-powers which, almost without exception, have been exercised against Republicans without regard to law or justice, make up a catalogue of wrongs, outrageous violations, and evasions of the spirit of the new constitution, unscrupulous malignity and partisan hate never paralleled in the history of parties in this country or any other.
Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1871) (remarks of Representative Platt).
“What is to be the case of a judge? . . . Is that State judge to be taken from his bench? Is he to be liable in an action? … It is the language of the bill: for there is no limitation whatsoever on the terms that are employed, and they are as comprehensive as can be used.
(remarks of Senator Thurman).
The 1866 Act was vetoed by President Johnson because it abrogated common law judicial immunity. In the fight to defeat the veto, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Trumbull expressed revulsion at the entire concept of judicial immunity: “It is the very doctrine out of which the rebellion was hatched.”
C. Pierson’s Adoption of Tenney v. Brandhove Was Startling Error
Instead of applying the unambiguous statute, Chief Justice Warren in Pierson adopted analysis of legislative privilege from Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), reading immunity into the statute because—he perceived—“The immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role is equally well established [as the speech and debate privilege], and we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.” Pierson at 554-555 (1967).
In Tenney Justice Frankfurter aligned the English speech liberty with the federal “speech or debate” analog in the United States Constitution at Article I, Sec. 6, cl. 1. Like Chief Justice Warren, Justice Frankfurter presumed—contrary to the unambiguous statute, and analyzing no legislative history—that the 42nd Congress would not have intended to limit any state’s legislative activity in enacting the 1871 law because Congress was itself a “staunch advocate of legislative freedom.” Id. at 376 (emphasis added). Tenney also held the narrow immunity was lost if “there was a usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive.” Id.
Yet judicial immunity is the opposite of legislative privilege—judges are sovereigns possessing not “rights” but delegated authority. While judges have all the rights of any citizen qua a citizen, a judge qua judge possesses no rights. “First and Fourteenth Amendments restrain “only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 621 (2000). The function of a judge is to adjudicate—apply the given law to properly-admitted facts. Judges are not representatives of voters, but radically independent of electoral will and accountability. There is no need for a judge to express opinions of her own or those she “represents” to create law—she is given law. Other than necessary for faithful adjudication, a judge’s private “freedom of conscience” is irrelevant to judicial function. Relevant “conscience” is given in the form of law that has matured through free debate elsewhere. County judges do not function as a body, and (should) have no one to “debate.” The framers of the United States and State of Minnesota constitutions did not draft a “judicial speech or debate” privilege because judges are not empowered to “speak or debate.”
There is no need to protect a judge’s “speech” other than to preserve ability to pronounce adjudication—merely a “substantial state interest” that must in all cases yield to fundamental rights. There being no “judicial speech” liberty in 1871, there is no reason to “presume” that the 1871 Congress would have seen need to expressly abrogate a tradition of immunity to constitutional injury that has never existed.
D. American Common Law Does Not Support Judicial Immunity
This Court has commanded that courts considering an officer’s affirmative defense of immunity must examine “the common law tradition.” In Pierson Chief justice Warren found that judicial immunity was “at least as well established” as legislative privilege in 1871 without conducting any historical analysis of common law, citing only Bradley’s (post-Civil Rights Act) holding and the King’s Bench case of Scott v. Stansfield. Pierson at 554. Yet Bradley was decided in 1872—a year after Congress passed Section 1983. Congress could not have had it in mind while debating Section 1983.
Justice Field’s articulation of immunity in Bradley was innovative—not descriptive. Bradley rationalized adopting the English sovereign immunity as good policy. “This provision of the law is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence, and without fear of consequences.” Bradley at n. 16. This policy exhortation was an expansion from the more restrictive rules analyzed in Randall v. Brigham, 74 U. S. 523 (1868): “[Was] the act done a judicial act, done within his jurisdiction?” Randall at 531. Randall acknowledged decisions which denied an absolute immunity “where the acts, in excess of jurisdiction, are done maliciously or corruptly.” Moreover, every authority cited in both Randall and Bradley is or adopts foreign law—the English sovereign immunity rules imposed by an autocracy our nation fought wars to become independent of. See, e.g., Randall, n. 14.
Far from an intent to incorporate common an English monarchical sovereign immunity rule, Congress in passing the unambiguous Civil Rights Act specifically intended to eliminate it as the source of the monumental evil of state-sponsored oppression jeopardizing our nation’s existence by precipitating civil warfare. Pierson was a startling—indeed dangerous—departure from principles settled at the founding of our nation and cherished for centuries since. Because the court of appeals extended immunity relying on Pierson’s progeny, Stump, it decided an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court pursuant to Rule 10(c): Whether this Court in Pierson exceeded its jurisdiction under Article III, and invaded legislative power under Article I, of the United States Constitution.
“We’re grateful for the opportunity to continue pressing these groundbreaking issues critical to families across America” says Cole Stuart, Executive Director of California Coalition. “Michelle has done a heroic job in representing Sandra and the children—two of which ran away after Judge Knutson threatened them. What this judge did to this family is an abomination to justice. We have the highest of hopes and prayers the Supreme Court sees our petition as worthy and grants permission to seek a writ” says Stuart.
A decision on the petition is expected in the late fall, 2015.
 Concepcion v. Cintron, 905 F. Supp. 57, 61 (D. P.R. 1995).
 Figueroa v. Blackburn, 39 F. Supp. 2d 479, 487 (2d. Cir. 1999).
 Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1985); Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 396 (5th Cir. 1982).
 Patten v. Glaser, 771 F.2d 1178, 1179 (8th Cir. N.D. 1985).
 Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying Dykes, infra.); Olajide v. Gaffey, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 991, *5, 2013 WL 57862 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2013).
 Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 946 (11th Cir. 1985) (reading Harper as “focused” on McAlester’s test, thereby perpetuating McAlester’s four factor test at Stump’s expense); William B. Cashion Nev. Spendthrift Trust v. Vance, 552 Fed. Appx. 884, 886 (11th Cir. 2014).
 The circuits have also perpetuated the Fifth Circuit’s erroneous pro-immunity “policy” (see McAlester at 1282-83) in defiance of the Court’s condemnation of “freewheeling” policy analysis from Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 339-340 (1986) through Rehberg v. Paulk,, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1503-07 (2012). Circuits applying a “freewheeling” policy include at least the Fifth (Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294, 297-98 (5th Cir. 1985); Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 1985) (“freewheeling” policy to immunize judge conspiring to plunder a corporation)); Ninth (Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986)); Tenth (Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d 435, 439 (10th Cir. 1983)); and Eleventh (Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 945 (11th Cir. 1985)).
 Minn. Stat. 148.88, Psychology Practice Act.
 Buchanan v. Ford, 638 F. Supp. 168 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (analogizing “child abuse worker” to police rather than prosecutor); Doe v. County of Suffolk, 494 F. Supp. 179 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (same).
 Austin v. Borel, 830 F.2d 1356, 1363 (5th Cir. 1987) (denying absolute immunity by analogizing social worker to complaining witness, without analyzing common law);
 Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1373 (8th Cir. 1996) (extending immunity to social worker initiating child protection proceedings by analogy to prosecutorial function, without analyzing common law);
 Doe v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated in Beltran v. Santa Clara County, 514 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2008) (Lebbos extended absolute immunity by analogy to prosecutor; Beltran overruled Lebbos. Neither case examined 1871 common law);
 Czikalla v. Malloy, 649 F. Supp. 1212 (D.Colo. 1986) (analogizing “child abuse worker” to police rather than prosecutor);
 See generally M. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not A Big Tent: The Improper Expansion Of Absolute Judicial Immunity To Non-Judges In Civil-Rights Cases, 59 SMU L.Rev. 265, 276.
 This distinction was recognized in Stump, 435 U. S. 349, 356 (1978), fn. 7. See also Randall v. Brigham, 74 U. S. 523, 535-36 (1868).
 App. 3a.
 Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d at 126-28 (extending judicial immunity to private child custody evaluator and apointed psychologist as “arms of the court”); D.T.B. v. Farmer, 114 F. App’x 446, 447 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying Hughes v. Long to immunize court-appointed psychologist); McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir. 1992) (immunizing appointed prison psychiatrist); Williams v. Consovoy, 333 F. Supp. 2d 297, 302 (D.N.J. 2004) (finding psychologist appointed by parole board absolutely immune); Pierson v. Members of Delaware County, No. 99-3435, 2000 WL 486608, at *4 (E.D. Pa. April 25, 2000) (appointed psychiatrist conducting competency evaluation absolutely immune as “an arm of the court); P.T., A.T. & H.T. v. Richard Hall Cmty. Mental Health Care Ctr., 364 N.J. Super. 460, 462 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (applying absolute judicial immunity to a court-appointed psychologist).
 Duzynski v. Nosal, 324 F.2d 924, 929 (7th Cir. 1963) (immunizing appointed psychologist evaluating mental health).
 Morstad v. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 147 F.3d 741, 744 (8th Cir. 1998) (immunizing appointed psychologist as “essential to the judicial process.”)); Moses v. Parwatikar, M.D., 813 F.2d 891, 892 (8th Cir. 1987), disapproved on other grounds, Burns v. Reed, 500 U. S. 478, 496 (1991) (extending absolute and witness immunity to court-appointed psychiatrist conducting competency examination); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1466-67 (8th Cir. 1987) (immunizing “[n]onjudicial persons who fulfill quasi-judicial functions intimately related to the judicial. . . . ”).
 Turney v. O’Toole, 898 F.2d 1470, 1474 (10th Cir. 1990) (extending quasi-judicial immunity to psychologist); Martinez v. Roth, No. 94-2206, 1995 WL 261127, at *3 (10th Cir. Apr. 26, 1995) (extending quasi-judicial immunity to court-appointed psychologist assisting court in “best interest of the child” investigation because service was “‘integral to the judicial process”’).
 See, e.g., Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 898-900 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497, 502-03 (9th Cir.1989) as “fundamentally inconsistent” with this Court’s decisions in Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U. S. 429 (1993) and Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U. S. 118 (1997)); Beltran v. Santa Clara County, 514 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 2008) (reversing Doe v. Lebbos , 348 F. 3d 820 (9th Cir. 2003) as inconsistent with Antoine and Kalina, and finding social workers not immune for investigative conduct); and Jensen v. Lane Cnty., 222 F.3d 570, 577 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no “firmly rooted tradition” at common law of absolute immunity for psychiatrist function).
 The court of appeals may have ignored the argument as “outside the scope” of the opening brief, citing Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736 (1985). Such would be error. Grazzini-Rucki’s opening brief set forth all four categories, arguing not one was immune.
 See also, Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 327-328 (1969) (hereinafter “Yale Note”)
 Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (App.) (1871); Yale Note at 327.
 See also Yale Note at 328 “there was no universal acceptance of the broad English immunity rule in 1871, and the only legislative history available supports the proposition that Congress intended Section 1983 to cover judges.” Yale Note at 328.
 Yale Note at 327.
 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1758 (1866) (remarks of Senator Trumbull); Yale Note at 328.
 That privilege is against arrest—not civil liability—does not extend to felonies or treason, or “breach of the peace.” Arrest outside of “Session” is permitted, and members maybe “questioned” for activity other than “speech or debate.” Tenney at 377.
 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U. S. 1030, 1074 (1991).
 3 Law Reports, Exchequer, 220 (1868), analyzed in Bradley at n. 16. Available at http://www.forgottenbooks.com/readbook_text/The_Law_Reports_1868_v3_1000098717/237.
 See J. Feinman, R. Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S. C. L. Rev. 201, 243-249, 254-56 (1979) (hereinafter “Suing Judges”) (“Certainly, no broad rule of immunity existed prior to Bradley. For most of the history of the common law, judges had only a very limited immunity.”); Yale Note at 323-327 (“[J]udicial immunity was not a universal doctrine.”).
 See Suing Judges at 224-43 (analysis of pre-Bradley primary sources).